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 Ghana has, until very recently, been involved in structural adjustment programs since 
1983 as a condition of its receipt of loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Structural adjustment required the restructuring of the Ghanaian economy in accordance with 
neoliberal economic theory with the intent of promoting economic development. The IMF has 
lauded the Ghanaian SAP experience as a success story based upon macro-level economic 
indicators that show growth in the national economy. However, this view ignores the micro-level 
economic effects of structural adjustment in Ghana, as well as the impacts on the country’s 
sociocultural and political circumstances. This paper uses a multidisciplinary approach to 
examine the broad reaching impacts that participation in structural adjustment programs have 
had on Ghanaian development. It argues that SAPs have done more harm than good in their 
economic, political, and sociocultural impacts and that Ghana has and will continue to see 
improvements in all of these areas as it distances itself from strict adherence to SAP 
recommendation following the recent exit from the program. 
Background and Introduction 
 
When a nation finds itself in need of funding to boost its economic prospects, one of its 
options is to take out a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Upon providing these 
loans, the IMF imposes conditionalities upon the receiving nation. These conditions include an 
agreement to adjust the national economy in ways specified by the IMF so that, ideally, the 
receiving nation will be able to overcome the economic hardship that led to the initial need for 
the loan, and so that it will be capable of repaying the IMF (“IMF Conditionality,” 2018). The 
nearly universal condition for a developing country receiving an IMF loan is the implementation 
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of Structural Adjustment Programs, or SAPs. Agreements to implement SAPs must be made 
prior to the struggling nation receiving any debt relief and must be upheld in order to be 
applicable for any future loans or additional funding from other nations (Konadu-Agyemang, 
2001). SAPs are built upon a neo-classical economic theory, which suggests that excessive and 
mismanaged government intervention in a nation’s economy will result in that nation facing 
strife (Konadu-Agyemang, 2001).  Therefore, SAPs implement a variety of changes to minimize 
the national government’s role in the domestic economy and promote free trade with the global 
market. Such changes include reducing public spending and transitioning social services to the 
private sector, limiting or removing state controls on pricing and international trade, and 
reducing or eliminating state involvement in industry (Konadu-Agyemang, 2001). According to 
neo-classical theory, these and similar changes to a nation’s economic structure will allow the 
market to operate freely and consequently bring about economic prosperity. 
Ghana’s Economy Pre-IMF Intervention 
 
 Under British imperialism, the Gold Coast, as Ghana was then called, implemented a 
Ten-Year Development Program during the years of 1920-1930. Through this program, the 
colonial government focused its economic activity largely on international trade rather than 
internal growth. Attempts were made to diversify agricultural exports due to concerns over the 
fluctuating global market price of cocoa, which at the time made up 83 percent of the colony’s 
exports (Aryeetey & Kanbur, 2017). Additionally, transportation infrastructure was targeted for 
improvement, but only in areas, such as ports and major rail lines, that prioritized international 
trade over internal movement of goods and labor (Aryeetey & Kanbur, 2017). However, these 
attempts did not succeed at promoting economic growth to the desired extent due, in part, to the 
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beginning of the Great Depression and inadequate financial support from the British government 
(Aryeetey & Kanbur, 2017). 
 When Ghana achieved independence in 1957, the new government adopted socialist 
economic practices, allowing for public involvement in and regulation of industry. However, the 
country was still largely dependent on cocoa exports, which experienced an enormous drop in 
global market prices during the early 1960s. This left the Nkrumah government without the 
income necessary to fund its socialist economic development plan (Aryeetey & Kanbur, 2017). 
Furthermore, the government attracted rampant criticism from the private sector for interference 
in the market with measures such as import and price controls. Nkrumah and his government 
were accused of designing economic policy to attract foreign investment and weaken their 
political opponents rather than to effectively promote industrialization and the growth of 
Ghanaian businesses (Aryeetey & Kanbur, 2017). However, the military coup that overthrew 
Nkrumah’s parliamentary government did not improve Ghana’s economic circumstances. The 
new government, called the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) focused heavily on 
achieving economic autonomy through growing the agricultural sector. This left the industrial 
infrastructure and capacity that had been built up during previous eras unused. With this sector of 
the economy failing to produce at full capacity combined with the poorly implemented economic 
development plans of a politically tumultuous time, Ghana experienced commodity shortages 
and soaring inflation rates (Aryeetey & Kanbur, 2017).  
In 1983, just twenty-six years following the nation’s independence, Ghana found itself on 
the edge of bankruptcy. It was under these desperate economic circumstances that the PNDC 
chose to borrow from the IMF and consequently engage Ghana in structural adjustment 
programs (Graham, 1988). As with most developing nations seeking economic relief from the 
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IMF, these grim conditions were blamed on the national government’s economic 
mismanagement and over-regulation (Konadu-Agyemang, 2001). With these assumptions and 
the state of the Ghanaian economy in mind, Ghana adopted neoliberal economic policies as 
prescribed by structural adjustment. From that point on, the Ghanaian economy has been closely 
monitored by the IMF and scholars worldwide as a prime example of SAP success in Africa.  
Ghana as the IMF’s Success Story 
 
The IMF has a vested interest in publicly acknowledging its structural adjustment success 
stories. When joining the IMF, each nation is assigned a quota, based upon its capability to pay 
into the organization, as determined by its position in the global economy (“IMF Quotas,” 2017). 
Receiving these quotas is a key component of the way in which the IMF to fund the distribution 
of its loans (“Where the IMF Gets Its Money,” 2017). While the IMF has additional forms of 
income besides member states’ quota payments, quotas are also essential to the IMF’s operations 
in other ways. The amount that a nation contributes via quotas is used to determine its voting 
power within the IMF (“IMF Quotas,” 2017). Therefore, the IMF has a responsibility to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of its programs to its member states, especially those contributing 
the highest quotas. Consequently, the IMF must prove the effectiveness of the SAPs to its 
member states, or risk losing legitimacy in the eyes of the member states responsible for both 
funding its activities and voting to determine what actions it may take. 
The IMF and World Bank have made hefty claims about the successful implementation 
of SAPs in the past. Among these is the claim that nearly all nations that properly implement 
structural adjustment either have experienced or will experience decreased poverty and a 
narrowing of the wealth gap between the rich and the poor (Konadu-Agyemang, 2001). Such 
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assertions on the potential for success are based on three basic, neoliberal assumptions. First, it is 
thought that failure to reform the struggling nation’s economy will lead to exacerbated economic 
difficulties such as unsustainable budgets and trade deficits, whose effects will be felt most 
severely by the poor population. Second, economic liberalization and deregulation are thought to 
be triggers for the creation of jobs, specifically in rural areas where the poor population tends to 
be concentrated. Finally, SAPs are intended to preserve the existence and delivery of welfare 
programs in areas of particular concern to poor populations (Konadu-Agyemang, 2001). For 
these reasons, the IMF claims that structural adjustment programs, when properly implemented 
by the developing country, have the capacity to improve overall economic conditions and target 
growth at the poorest sectors of the population. 
One of the nations whose experience the IMF often points to as evidence of structural 
adjustment’s viability and legitimacy is Ghana. Claims of successful outcomes from SAP 
implementation in Ghana rest primarily upon economic indicators such as GDP, overall growth, 
and inflation rates. Over the first two years of SAP implementation Ghana’s GDP saw significant 
initial growth averaging 3.3 percent. Additionally, the inflation rate dropped from 75 percent in 
1983 to 20 percent in 1985 (Graham 1988). By 2012, Ghana’s annual GDP growth rate had 
reached around 5.5 percent, which is thought to be a direct result of SAP-driven policy changes 
(Bonga-Bonga & Ahaikpor, 2016). In late 2018, the IMF announced, following a visit to review 
the health of the Ghanaian economy, that it was on track to remain within target ranges of 
economic indicators for the year. The government was praised for following SAP parameters and 
encouraging strong growth via the oil and cocoa industries despite external market factors 
causing depreciation of the Ghanaian currency, the cedi (“IMF Staff Completes Seventh ECF 
Review Visit to Ghana,” 2018). All of these indicators point to SAPs having improved the 
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economic conditions within Ghana throughout their more than three decades of influencing 
Ghanaian economic policy. However, GDP growth and inflation do not provide a complete 
picture of the health of an economy, much less the social and political circumstances that have 
arisen in Ghana as a result of SAP implementation. 
Soon after Ghana’s government at the time, the Provisional National Defense Council 
(PNDC), began seeking loans from and following the policy prescriptions of the IMF, scholars 
expressed worry about the potential effects of such policies. These concerns were ignored as the 
PNDC used its authoritarian position to rapidly transition Ghana’s economic policy into that of 
the neoliberal model (Williams 2015). Despite the country’s standard of living beginning to rise, 
concerns were voiced about traditional export industries failing to meet protected goals, rising 
public health costs, job loss and low incomes, and the dependence and conditionality that 
accompany receiving IMF loans (Graham 1988). Similar concerns have continued through today, 
even after the PNDC left power in 1992. Furthermore, scholars outside the field of economics 
warn that the sociocultural and political effects of SAPs have been even less beneficial. 
More detailed indicators present a more complex picture of severe economic inequality 
continuing to plague Ghana. The country’s two poorest regions, the Upper East and the Upper 
West, have continued to become poorer due to being excluded from the distribution of 
development funding (Abdulai, 2016). Wealth inequality, rather than contracting as the IMF 
promises, has expanded alongside an increase in the total number of Ghanaians living in poverty 
(Konadu-Agyemang & Kwaku Takyi, 2001). Beyond economic health, SAPs have had lasting 
impacts on Ghana’s political and sociocultural climates. This paper will explore SAP’s mid and 
micro-level economic impacts, as well as their social impacts through the lenses of social 
services, traditional industries, and labor migration. It will also examine structural adjustment’s 
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influences on politics in Ghana through discussions of SAP’s direct impact on Ghanaian 
democracy, the distribution of development funds, and the political implications of a neoliberal 
approach toward managing the nation’s oil fields. This paper will argue that SAPs have done 
more harm than good in their economic, political, and sociocultural impacts and that Ghana has 
and will continue to see improvements in all of these areas as it distances itself from strict 
adherence to SAP recommendation.  
Literature Review 
 
 Being the IMF’s African “success story,” the Ghanaian economy has attracted a wide 
array of research. A consensus has not been reached on whether Ghana has continued to 
experience economic growth after two decades of SAPs. Some refer to the rapid growth of the 
Ghanaian economy, as compared to the struggles in the rest of Africa, as an indicator of a 
healthy economy (Bonga-Bonga & Ahaikpor, 2016). Others claim that the beneficial effects of 
SAPs were short-lived, citing a cocoa industry heavily impacted by currency devaluation, a 
deteriorating health care industry following privatization, and high education costs that are 
unaffordable for many citizens (Ankomah 2004). These issues presented themselves as early as 
1987, when food, fuel and social services subsidies began to give way to the imposition of fees 
for health care, education, water, and electricity. The Ghanaian government’s withdrawal from 
the nation’s economy had such an influence that the PNDC was forced to recognize that the poor 
would have to shoulder the short-term burden of economic transition (Williams 2015). These 
different conclusions can be attributed to focus on different variables; purely economic indicators 
paint a picture of overall growth, but examining certain industries, socioeconomic groups, 
political conditions, and social services reveal that the benefits of growth have not been evenly 
distributed. 
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 Researchers have approached the question of distribution of SAP benefits from a largely 
political perspective. Abdoulai (2017) found that regional inequalities have occurred because of 
unequal distribution of foreign development aid, which has prioritized funding private sector 
projects with rapidly visible impacts in regions whose political leaders have influence in the 
national government. Furthermore, a combination of domestic and international actors has been 
found to share control over the decision making and implementation of Ghana’s health policies 
(Gómez and Ruger 2015). The Ghanaian national government is also dependent on international 
aid to fund its education system and faces pressure from the international community to prepare 
its children to successfully compete on the global market (Kuyini 2013). This research shows 
that international intervention such as IMF lending has impacted the political climate and 
operations of Ghana. 
 Finally, researchers have examined the cultural impacts of the hardships that traditional 
industries have faced as a result of IMF loan conditionality. Awanyo (1998) concluded that 
cocoa farmers have chosen not to abandon their struggling industry because of the social 
relationships and cultural expectations associated with the occupation. Similarly, self-efficacy 
and social capital have been found to influence the success of contract farming, and cultural 
change due to historical experience has resulted in varying levels of these in different regions 
within Ghana (Wuepper and Sauer 2016). Therefore, SAPs and other internationally sponsored 
policies have had identifiable cultural impacts on the Ghanaian people. 
 While long-term IMF lending and SAP implementation in Ghana has attracted many 
researchers to study their economic, political, and sociocultural effects, scholars have examined 
these only in isolation. Even those resources that compile some of these factors are not 
exhaustive. For example, the 2001 book edited by Kowadwo Konadu-Agyemang consists of 
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articles by many scholars on a range of effects that SAPs have had on Ghana, but even this 
source has a primarily economic focus with only surface-level discussion of social policy and 
political factors. However, economics, politics, social life, and culture do not exist in isolation 
from one another. Therefore, it is essential to thoroughly examine the interrelation of the three in 
order to achieve a complete understanding of the effects that international loan conditionality has 
had on Ghana. Additionally, the most comprehensive examinations of SAPs in Ghana have 
become outdated, often featuring analyses ending in the late 1990s (Konandu-Agyemang 2001).  
Therefore, more recent, comprehensive analyses of Ghana’s SAP experience are needed to 
determine whether the nation will benefit from its recent decision to distance itself from the 
program (Naeche, 2018). Only by examining the political dynamics that produce and implement 
SAPs and similar policies in Ghana, their economic and sociocultural consequences, and the 
reactionary political climate that has emerged can fully informed conclusions be drawn on the 
effects of international lending in Ghana. 
Methods 
 
 This project consists of the compilation and analysis of existing scholarly works from 
multiple disciplines on the topic of structural adjustment in Ghana. Research was accomplished 
by analyzing scholarly journal articles and books in the economic, sociological, and political 
science fields. Early in the process, sources which gave broad overviews of Ghana’s experience 
with structural adjustment were prioritized. This allowed for the most significant impacts of such 
policies on Ghana’s economic, sociocultural, and political circumstances to be identified. The 
research process then progressed towards identifying and analyzing scholarly works which 
provided in-depth analyses on each of these impacts. A concerted effort was made to include 
evidence of both positive and negative effects of SAPs on Ghana, depending upon the consensus 
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observed in the literature on each topic. The opinions of the International Monetary Fund 
regarding the economic impacts of SAPs were also examined using pages from its official 
website, media reports on IMF press releases, and official IMF documents. 
Structural Adjustment and Ghana’s Economy 
 
SAP-Led Changes to Ghana’s Economic Structure 
 
 When Ghana first adopted IMF loan conditionality in the form of structural adjustment 
programs the party in power at the time, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), saw 
allowing the IMF and other Western actors to heavily influence Ghanaian economic policy as the 
most practical route towards economic stability and growth (Graham, 1988). In order to do so, 
the national government launched its economic recovery program (ERP) in partnership with the 
IMF and the World Bank, which has been influencing the structure of the Ghanaian economy 
ever since (Konadu-Agyemang & Kwaku Takyi, 2001). The ERP rested upon a “trickle down” 
theory in which increases to the gross domestic product (GDP) and the gross national product 
(GNP) were expected to subsequently lead to greater economic opportunities and more equal 
wealth distribution among the Ghanaian population. In other words, growth of the national 
economy was encouraged at all costs under the assumption that it would stimulate similar growth 
in all sectors (Konadu-Agyemang & Kwaku Takyi, 2001). With this goal in mind, the PNDC, 
under IMF supervision, began transitioning Ghana towards a neoliberal economic structure. 
 Some of the primary components of Ghana’s ERA were privatization, minimization of 
public spending along with maximization of revenue, and focus on the export sector. Increases in 
private investment were encouraged in order to alleviate some of the financial burden that had 
been resting on the public sector (Graham, 1988). Huge cuts were made to the public sector in 
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order to privatize under the neoliberal assumption that government interference in an economy 
leads to decline. From the implementation of the ERA in 1983 to 1992, 200,000 government 
employees saw either their jobs eliminated, or their salaries lowered in cost-cutting efforts. 
Finally, the PNDC achieved additional cuts to public spending by reducing or entirely abolishing 
government subsidies for consumer goods, social services, and public institutions’ budgets 
(Graham, 1988). In conjunction with efforts to reduce public expenditure, the PNDC aimed to 
maximize government revenue, primarily through taxation. New taxes were introduced, existing 
taxes were raised, and the system for tax collection was reformed to make it more efficient 
(Graham, 1988). Therefore, SAP influence restructured the Ghanaian economy to minimize 
public expenditure while maximizing revenue. 
Restructuring to prioritize cuts to public expenditure is required under IMF loan 
conditionality in order to create room for growth of the private sector and limit government 
influence over the economy, both key components of the neoliberal view of a healthy economy 
(Konadu-Agyemang & Kwaku Takyi, 2001). Many of these cutbacks were made in the provision 
of social services. For example, in 1987, Ghana’s Education Reform Program transitioned the 
nation’s education system to a privatized model following IMF and World Bank calls to cut 
public spending (Kuyini, 2013). Likewise, the Hospital Fee Regulation Act of 1985 created the 
nation’s cash-and-carry healthcare system, in which patients were required to pay fees for care in 
all public hospitals (Kusi-Ampofo, Church, Conteh, & Heinmiller, 2015). Another way in which 
government influence was minimized was through deregulation. The PNDC removed price 
controls on all but eight consumer goods. Additionally, what is left of Ghana’s price control 
system has been rendered ineffective due to lack of enforcement (Graham, 1988). Through 
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privatization and deregulation, the PNDC managed to minimize government influence over the 
Ghanaian economy as prescribed by the neoliberal economic theory behind SAPs. 
Another essential piece to increasing the viability of a nation’s economy under neoliberal 
theory is enhancing its ability to compete in the global market. The PNDC’s approach to 
increasing the competitiveness of Ghana’s economy centered around pushing growth in the 
export sector. Efforts to do so included foreign investment being diverted towards supporting 
export industries such as mining and timber, as well as improving the transportation 
infrastructure for these industries (Graham, 1988). Additionally, Ghana’s currency, the cedi, was 
devalued in order to establish a “realistic exchange rate” (Graham, 1988). These efforts were all 
intended to increase Ghana’s ability to produce marketable goods and effectively trade them on 
the world market and attract foreign investment by raising international confidence that the 
Ghanaian economy was on the rise (Graham 1988). This desired confidence did emerge, as 
evidenced by the fact that Western industrialized nations have been sponsoring Ghanaian 
development projects for more than three decades (Konadu-Agyemang & Kwaku Takyi, 2001). 
The question remains, however, whether SAPs have improved the Ghanaian economy to the 
extent that these foreign investors seem to think. 
Economic Results of SAPs and Current Circumstances 
 
 Despite early improvements in GDP and inflation rates during the first two years of 
Ghana’s implementation of SAPs, concerns began to emerge in the late 1980s that the ERA was 
not following through on all of its promises. Key among these concerns was the painfully slow 
progress being made in improving several economic indicators. By 1988, not a single export 
commodity targeted by the ERA had met its production goal, with timber reaching only about 15 
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percent of its target and manufacturing reaching approximately 11.5 percent (Graham, 1988). 
Additionally, when the public sector began laying off workers by the tens of thousands and 
cutting the wages of those who remained to rates well below the cost of living, scholars began 
predicting that the private sector would follow suit rather than adding higher paid jobs as policy 
makers had originally suggested (Graham, 1988). Finally, debt service rose to 60 percent of 
Ghana’s annual export earnings between 1985 and 1988, which was predicted to mean that the 
government would have to continue to borrow in order to maintain payments (Graham, 1988). 
These early indicators left scholars worried that SAPs would not, in fact, be beneficial to the 
nation’s poor population, who would be hit hardest by tightening budgets. All of these concerns 
have continued to be voiced decades after the initial implementation of the ERA. 
 By the late 1990s it had become abundantly clear that devaluation of the cedi, which had 
been intended to promote export industries by making their prices lower and more competitive 
on the global market, had failed its purpose. The currency had devalued 120,000 percent over 16 
years and reached a rate of 3400 cedis per US $1 by 1999 (Konadu-Agyemang & Kwaku Takyi, 
2001). However, this devaluation did not promote exports to the anticipated extent because 
Ghanaian products were entering an already flooded market full of commodities from nations 
that were also implementing similar devaluation tactics (Konadu-Agyemang & Kwaku Takyi, 
2001). Therefore, Ghanaian exports were not, in practice, priced lower than those from other 
countries. There also was not enough global demand to match increased production rates 
(Konadu-Agyemang & Kwaku Takyi, 2001). Devaluation ultimately did not provide the 
intended benefit of increasing Ghana’s export economy, but it had the negative effect of raising 
import costs substantially. 
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 Concerns have also endured over the past three decades about the expectation that private 
sector growth can make up for substantial cuts to the public sector and the growing burden of 
debt and debt servicing responsibilities. As feared in the late 1980s, instead of adding jobs to tap 
into the large labor market left by cuts in the public sector, the private sector also experienced 
massive layoffs and wage reductions. This was due to pressure from competitively cheap 
imports. SAP trade liberalization allowed the Ghanaian market to be flooded with low-priced 
imports. Ghana’s young local industries could not compete with the cheap production costs of 
huge international firms, causing many Ghanaian employers to either close down or cut costs 
through layoffs and wage reduction (Panford, 2001). Additionally, more lenient labor regulations 
intended to attract foreign donors have led to unfairly executed layoffs with inadequate 
severance packages (Panford, 2001). It is therefore evident that SAPs failed to incentivize job 
growth in the private sector, and workers have been left to face the consequences. 
 As anticipated based on the first five years of structural adjustment in Ghana, public debt 
has continued to grow rapidly. This is concerning because economists generally agree that rising 
debt is negatively correlated with economic growth in developing economies, especially when 
debt service becomes a significant burden (Amoako-Tuffour, 2001). Both Ghana’s domestic and 
external debt to GDP ratios have risen steadily since 1983, with total public debt reaching 
between 50 and 62 percent in 2014 (“Time for Thrift; Ghana and the IMF,” 2014). However, 
economic theory states that the true indication of a debt crisis is not any particular debt to GDP 
ratio, but when external debt and total debt service reach 200 percent and 20 percent of exports 
respectively. These levels indicate a debt spiral, where a government is no longer able to service 
its debt without further borrowing. Ghana reached this danger point in 1995 (Amoako-Tuffour, 
2001). Considering Ghana’s interest payments increased from 2013 to 2017 (International 
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Monetary Fund, 2018) the nation’s struggles with debt service will have only risen along with its 
debt to GDP ratio. 
 Despite many scholars criticizing the impacts of SAPs on Ghana’s export industries, 
unemployment and underemployment rate, and debt servicing burden, the IMF consistently calls 
Ghana’s participation in SAPs an economic success. Ghana was considered the fastest growing 
African economy in 2014 due to its 8 percent average growth rate (Bonga-Bonga & Ahaikpor, 
2016). In 2017, Ghana’s economic growth rate was slightly lower, but still above 6 percent 
(International Monetary Fund, 2018). Additionally, it had dropped below 10 percent by the end 
of 2018 (Naeche, 2018). Because of these and other national economic indicators, the IMF’s 
Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, stated that the country’s most recent IMF program had 
allowed for successful economic adjustment. She also made a point to praise Ghanaian 
authorities for adhering to SAP policy recommendations (Mboto Fouda, 2018), and emphasized 
the importance of continuing along the same path once the country discontinues its formal SAP 
implementation (Naeche, 2018). In other words, the IMF is generally happy with the condition of 
Ghana’s economy and considers its improvement to be the direct result of participation in 
structural adjustment. 
However, even the IMF recognizes that Ghana continues to have room for improving its 
economic health. Lagarde specifically referenced “a large debt stock, low revenue base, large 
non‑performing loans, fragilities in the financial sector and still relatively low levels of foreign 
exchange reserves” (Naeche, 2018). Others examining the nation’s economy from a neoliberal 
perspective have pointed to the fiscal deficit of 10.1 percent of GDP in 2013 as evidence that 
wage increases in the public sector in 2012 have increased government expenses too drastically 
(“Time for Thrift; Ghana and the IMF,” 2014). In order to assist Ghana in continuing to improve 
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upon these weaker areas, the IMF intends to continue advising the nation following its exit from 
structural adjustment (Mboto Fouda, 2018). This indicates that the IMF feels that Ghana can 
continue to grow its economy by following SAP-prescribed policies, even when no longer part of 
an IMF program. 
Wealth Distribution and Inequality 
 
Despite all the broad, macro-level improvements to Ghana’s economy that the IMF and 
other supporters point to as evidence of SAP success, one that indicates failure on the micro-
level is poverty. One of structural adjustment’s primary goals has always been mitigation of 
poverty. However, many of the economic impacts of SAPs on Ghana’s economy are thought to 
have had their largest consequences affect the poor. Ghana’s overall poverty rate has seen 
significant improvement since the introduction of SAPs. Nationwide poverty incidence originally 
increased from 56 percent in 1988 to 61 percent in 1989 but then decreased to 24 percent by 
2013. Extreme poverty also saw a significant drop from 42 percent to 8 percent during these 
same years (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). Despite this overall decline in poverty rate, it is 
thought that, due to population growth, the total number of people living in poverty has increased 
(Konadu-Agyemang & Kwaku Takyi, 2001). Additionally, the severity of the poverty that 
remains continues to increase. It is anticipated that, with Ghana’s trend of overall economic 
growth, those living in poverty will not cross the poverty line for 30 years, and those considered 
to be “ultra-poor” will remain impoverished for another 40 years (Konadu-Agyemang & Kwaku 
Takyi, 2001). Therefore, those Ghanaians currently living in poverty face more severe 
consequences than in the past. 
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Another major concern is that the wealth gap between those living in poverty and those 
who are not has widened. While Ghana’s overall poverty rate has declined, both vertical and 
horizontal inequality have worsened. Evidence of vertical wealth and income inequality can be 
found in the widening gap between the affluent Ghanaian population and the nation’s poor. 
Between 1988 and 2013, Ghana’s Living Standards Surveys indicated that the nation’s level of 
inequality as measured by the Gini index rose from 0.324 to 0.409 (McKay & Osei-Assibey, 
2017). This measure demonstrates a widening gap between the rich and the poor. Such evidence 
of widening inequality has left scholars concerned that the economic growth heralded by the IMF 
as evidence of SAP success in Ghana has not been distributed evenly across the country 
(Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). The failure to distribute economic growth across 
socioeconomic groups is attributed to the approach taken within structural adjustment to achieve 
such growth. Ghana’s ERA selected particular industries to promote, namely exports such as oil 
and agricultural products. These industries are not closely enough linked to other sectors to allow 
their prosperity to spread (McKay & Osei-Assibey, 2017). Therefore, the economic development 
brought by participation in SAPs has concentrated wealth in isolated areas of the Ghanaian 
economy and, consequently, further disadvantaged the nation’s poor. 
Horizontal wealth and income inequality exist in Ghana between the rural, agrarian north 
and the urban, industrial south.1 While Ghana’s northern region is home to only 17 percent of the 
nation’s total population, it accounts for 40 percent of the nation’s poor (Abdulai, Bawole, & 
Kojo Sakyi, 2018). The economic marginalization of the north has its roots in Ghana’s colonial 
period but has continued worsening since the implementation of SAPs. British colonialists 
identified southern Ghana as the region with preferable agro-climatic conditions for the 
                                               
1 See Appendix A 
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production of export crops and incorporated the north into its colonial territory as a source of 
cheap labor. The productive potential of the north, such as abundant cotton farming, was not 
invested in so that the industries in the south would not lose access to this labor pool (Abdulai, 
Bawole, & Kojo Sakyi, 2018). This failure to invest in the north has continued since 
implementation of structural adjustment with disproportionate allocation of development funds. 
For example, the United States-funded Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which was 
intended to combat poverty, did not invest any of its US $547 million in either the Upper East or 
the Upper West, Ghana’s two poorest regions (Abdulai, 2016). It is therefore evident that the 
rural northern region of the country has remained subject to high levels of poverty because it has 
been passed over by SAP-prescribed development projects. 
One of the reasons for the continued marginalization of the north in regard to 
development investment is the continued belief that these rural areas hold no productive 
potential. Ghana’s ERP has focused heavily on promoting export industries such as cocoa, which 
is primarily grown in the south. The north is thought to only have the adequate conditions for 
production of food agriculture, which excludes it from programs meant to invest in exports 
(Abdulai, Bawole, & Kojo Sakyi, 2018). Additionally, the 2009 World Development Report 
warned developing countries that targeting regions lacking in resources for poverty reduction 
could harm the nation’s overall economic development. (Abdulai, Bawole, & Kojo Sakyi, 2018). 
However, the assumption that northern Ghana cannot produce export crops is simply a fallacy 
left from the colonial era. The region used to be a net exporter of rice, but since the IMF 
mandated the removal of protective import tariffs, Ghanaian growers have been unable to 
compete. Consequently, Ghana now imports US $500 million worth of rice each year (Abdulai, 
Bawole, & Kojo Sakyi, 2018). Therefore, it is the IMF and structural adjustment that are 
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standing in the way of the expansion of northern industries such as rice and cotton into the export 
sector. 
Another consequence of Ghana’s tendency to invest in southern-based sectors is the 
overall decline of the agricultural industry. The northern region’s economy is built around food 
production (Abdulai, Bawole, & Kojo Sakyi, 2018). While southern producers of export crops 
such as cocoa are privileged above this, the urban industries of the south are promoted even more 
highly (McKay & Osei-Assibey, 2017). This has caused job growth in areas such as information, 
communication, transport, and finance. These industries inherently privilege urban communities 
because those from the rural north have limited access to both these types of jobs and the 
resources to acquire the skills necessary to fill them (McKay & Osei-Assibey, 2017). Because of 
these conditions, the modernizing of Ghana’s economy and movement away from agriculture 
under structural adjustment have reinforced northern poverty. Ghana’s rural northern regions are 
caught in a cycle of poverty that has only been reinforced by structural adjustment’s 
recommendations to concentrate investment on promoting exports and modern industry rather 
than alleviating poverty and the IMF’s refusal to permit the protectionist policies necessary to 
allow budding industries to advance to the point of stimulating the northern economy. 
Economically-Motivated Labor Migration 
 
A highly visible effect of Ghana’s continued economic struggles while participating in 
structural adjustment has been the phenomenon of labor migration. The West African country 
has a history of economically-motivated emigration among multiple class groups, but the most 
strenuous migration experiences have been concentrated among those within the lower class who 
have little or no access to the types of resources necessary for a successful migration project. 
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Ghanaians who experienced failed migration projects often engage in a cyclical pattern of 
migration in which they either voluntarily or involuntarily return home before re-migrating to try 
again to achieve economic prosperity abroad. The prevalence of labor migration and the need to 
re-migrate following a failed first attempt exemplifies the real-life consequences of Ghana’s 
growing economic inequality. 
 Much of the emigration from Ghana consists of young people, especially men, hoping to 
escape the poverty they have experienced at home and discover possibilities of supporting their 
families from afar (Dako-Gyeke, 2015). Because the trend of emigration is most common among 
the youth generations, Ghana’s economy has felt the loss of its workforce severely enough to 
introduce policies meant to encourage the return of migrants. For example, Ghanaians are able to 
apply for dual citizenship, and government ministries have been created to provide support for 
Ghanaian citizens living abroad (Obeng-Odoom, 2017). Based on these actions, it is clear that 
the national government of Ghana is aware of the economic strain that results from its young 
population seeking employment elsewhere and is motivated to shift the trend towards temporary 
rather than permanent migration. However, this approach fails to address the underlying issue 
causing young Ghanaians to migrate in the first place – their sense of being unable to make an 
adequate living in their home country. 
In an attempt to allow for Ghanaians finding success abroad to contribute to the Ghanaian 
economy, returned migrants in national politics have enacted and interpreted laws that allow 
members of the diaspora to send money home (Obeng-Odoom, 2017). Yet the conditions that 
lead to the initial need to emigrate are still in existence. Unequal land distribution is one of the 
leading causes of both internal and international migration in Ghana. Landlords are able to 
arbitrarily drive up rental costs in order to evict lower income tenants in favor of more affluent 
 23 
ones. There also exists a common tendency to blatantly deny or restrict land rights of those who 
have been forced from their regions and countries of origin (Obeng-Odoom, 2017). Both of these 
patterns exacerbate income and wealth inequality in Ghana and make it more likely for citizens 
to feel pressured to leave the country in search of a sustainable livelihood. It is therefore evident 
that the hands-off governmental approach to such regulations prescribed by SAPs is contributing 
to, rather than lessening socioeconomic class inequality. If legal protections were put into place 
against class discrimination in land use, far fewer Ghanaians would feel pressured to go abroad 
in search of ways to support their struggling families at home. 
 Another difficulty that lower-class Ghanaians face, even after making the decision to 
migrate, is their lower likelihood of success in their migration projects. When preparing to 
migrate, many Ghanaians express preference for emigrating to Western countries with healthy 
labor markets such as the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. (Dako-Gyeke, 2015). However, travelling 
to these countries is much easier for affluent Ghanaians who can obtain the necessary 
documents. Those who are unable to do so have historically been more likely to come across 
conditions leading to involuntary return to Ghana. This is due to the fact that, without visas, 
migrants either choose to go to other African countries such as Libya or travel illegally into 
Western countries (Kleist, 2017a). Those in the large group of Ghanaians who went to Libya 
looking for work were either forcibly evacuated when the civil war broke out in 2011, or else 
were trapped in a conflict zone having lost their savings in the banking collapse and forced to use 
what little money they had left to return to Ghana (Kleist, 2017b). Those who try their luck as 
undocumented laborers in Western nations are more often than not subjected to unfair wages and 
poor working conditions from employers seeking to take advantage of their inability to pursue 
legal responses (Dako-Gyeke, 2015). Furthermore, if they are discovered living in the host 
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country without proper documentation, the migrants are deported, which can include struggles 
ranging from a period of detainment prior to air deportation, to being left just over the border of 
the country from which they came (whether or not this is their home country) without the 
resources to travel home (Kleist, 2017b). Because of the dangers associated with less costly 
migration, lower-class Ghanaians are not only more likely to need to migrate for economic 
reasons but are far less likely to successfully save up enough money to voluntarily return to their 
communities. 
 The likelihood of the poorest Ghanaians having to participate in involuntary return 
migration makes it abundantly clear that the wealth gap in Ghana influences the success of a 
migration attempt. Aside from the various forms of involuntary return being strenuous upon the 
migrant personally, those who are forced to return home before accomplishing their goals are far 
more likely to participate in repeat migration. This is evident from the fact that Ghanaians who 
migrate to other African countries, the second choice after Western nations, are more likely to 
participate in cyclical migration (González‐Ferrer et al., 2014). These migrants’ economic 
circumstances force them to migrate to regions where they are less likely to accomplish their 
intentions behind migrating and are therefore more likely to need to re-migrate. Furthermore, 
those who originally migrated to seek educational opportunities rather than out of economic 
necessity are much more likely to willingly return to Ghana (González‐Ferrer et al., 2014). 
Migrants who leave under less severe financial circumstances are more likely to return having 
accomplished their goal. This means the process of migration reinforces existing inequalities by 
favoring those who leave only with the intention of furthering their education. These facts both 
exemplify the ways in which money provides privilege even to labor migrants. Instead of 
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providing the poorest migrants with the resources and opportunities they need to climb the 
socioeconomic ladder, the process of migration merely reinforces Ghana’s widening wealth gap. 
Those who return to Ghana following a failed migration attempt often find themselves in 
worse economic circumstances than they experienced prior to departure and, consequently, must 
move in with family (Kleist, 2017b). Aside from having failed to build an economic livelihood 
for themselves, any career prospects and networking connections the migrant may have had in 
the host country was either left behind, in the case of deportation, or no longer exists, in the case 
of emergency evacuation. Furthermore, in many cases, returned migrants will find themselves 
facing debt as the result of their involuntary return (Kleist, 2017b). As economically straining as 
it can be for a migrant to involuntarily return to Ghana only to find themselves dependent upon 
their loved ones, this situation can also be very hard on the families. Those who had sponsored 
family members’ migrations in exchange for money being sent back to them can no longer rely 
on this source of income to put food on the table or fund their children’s school fees (Kleist, 
2017b). Therefore, they have not only lost whatever money they had contributed to sending the 
migrant abroad, but also any return they had hoped to see on their investment. For a family poor 
enough to feel pressured to send a son, daughter, or sibling abroad, this type of loss can be 
devastating. However, the economic strain does not end when the migrant returns home. When 
the migrant is forced to move into a family member’s home having lost all of their savings and 
job prospects, as well as accumulated debt, that returnee becomes a financial burden rather than a 
contributor (Kleist, 2017a). The family will, of course take the returned migrant in, in part due to 
the hope that the migrant will once again find prosperity and reciprocate in turn (Kleist, 2017a). 
This dynamic establishes pressure upon the returnee to re-migrate in order to repay their family. 
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Ghana’s experience of cyclical migration is indicative of the failure of SAPs to provide 
equal economic opportunity. The ideal solution to this problem would be to reduce the rates of 
initial migration by ensuring that Ghanaian citizens receive equal access to land and all of the 
economic opportunities associated with it. Additionally, if the wealth gap were narrowed, those 
who are still compelled to migrate would not face additional such severe class discrimination in 
the form of costly immigration processes and documentation. This would reduce the number of 
individuals forced to migrate illegally or to unstable regions due to the costs of more ideal forms 
of migration and therefore be far more likely to experience involuntary return migration and, in 
turn, feel compelled to re-migrate. Successfully combatting the growing wealth gap in Ghana 
would lead to fewer Ghanaians migrating due to economic reasons, fewer labor migrants being 
forced to return to Ghana before reaching economic stability, and fewer returned migrants being 
pressured to re-migrate. Because the reality of Ghana’s experience under SAPs has been this 
widening of wealth inequality instead of the increased economic equality promised by the IMF, 
successful handling of migration-related issues in Ghana will have to include deviation from the 
SAP-prescribed economic structure. 
Declining Agricultural Industry 
 
 Ghana’s attempts to promote its agricultural industries under structural adjustment have 
centered around two primary goals. Southern export crops such as cocoa have been targeted as 
means of raising export revenue and, by extension, GDP. Additionally, contract farming has 
been implemented in multiple agricultural industries as a method of combatting poverty among 
rural farmers. However, neither of these approaches has been as successful in promoting 
economic viability in these industries as was originally hoped. 
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 When structural adjustment was first introduced in Ghana, there was widespread concern 
over the failing cocoa industry. Cocoa has historically been an essential component of Ghana’s 
export earnings; even during the period of huge declines in outputs from 1970 to 1988, cocoa 
still accounted for about 50 percent of the nation’s export revenue (Osei-Akom, 2001). 
Therefore, dropping yields due to poor pricing and labor policies and detrimental climatic 
conditions sparked the creation of the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (CRP) as a component of 
Ghana’s SAPs in 1988 (Osei-Akom, 2001). The program focused on incentivizing farmers to 
increase yields by raising their share of the sale price to 55 percent. This was to be accomplished 
through devaluation of the cedi and investment in the development of high-yield cocoa crops and 
training farmers to effectively use input technologies such as fertilizers and insecticides (Osei-
Akom, 2001). However, this approach had limited success, largely because of its failure to 
account for the burden that input costs place on farmers. 
 Farmers’ share of cocoa export prices did nearly double by 1995, causing output levels to 
begin to rise (Osei-Akom, 2001), but this wasn’t enough to incentivize outputs to the extent for 
which the CRP had aimed. Fertilizers, insecticides, and herbicides became more physically 
available to rural farmers thanks to SAP-driven investment in transportation infrastructure, but 
they became inaccessible due to rising costs. The costs of these inputs rose drastically due to the 
elimination of government subsidies, meaning that the benefits of farmers receiving a larger 
share of cocoa export prices couldn’t make up for production costs (Osei-Akom, 2001). 
Therefore, many farmers began converting their farms to the production of crops with lower 
input costs, further limiting the growth potential of the cocoa industry (Osei-Akom, 2001). 
Because of such weaknesses in the CRP’s approach toward incentivizing cocoa production, 
output rates grew much more slowly than anticipated. It was not until the early 2000s that cocoa 
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production reached its height in Ghana, and even at this time growth was lower than pre-SAP 
rates (Dzanku & Udry, 2017). Since then, yields have continued increasing, although the rate of 
growth has dropped even further (Dzanku & Udry, 2017). Therefore, the CRP has been only 
moderately successful in promoting growth in Ghana’s most important agricultural export 
industry. 
 The second SAP-era approach towards growing the agricultural sector has been the 
introduction of contract farming. Contract farming is a system in which agreements are reached 
between farmers and buyers, before the time of planting, about the manner of production and 
conditions of purchasing an agricultural product. This method is meant to promote coordination 
between buyer and seller, lower transaction costs, overcome market uncertainties, modernize 
agricultural practices, and increase production (Ragasa, Lambrecht, & Kufoalor, 2018). This 
organizational system has also been lauded for its potential to address high rates of poverty 
among rural farmers (Awanyo, 1998). However, most industries involved in the poverty 
reduction strategy of contract farming, such as cocoa and pineapple, are concentrated in Ghana’s 
wealthier southern region (Awanyo, 1998; Wuepper & Sauer, 2016). One northern-based 
industry that the strategy has been applied to is maize production, but contract farming has not 
proven to successfully address poverty in this industry. 
 Being a part of a contract farming scheme is meant to benefit both farmers and scheme 
managers by providing farmers with an input package with which to increase the yields of their 
plots, a part of which scheme managers then receive as repayment for the input package (Ragasa, 
Lambrecht, & Kufoalor, 2018). However, this only assists in reducing poverty rates among 
farmers if the increased crop yields more than make up for the costs of the input packages. For 
maize farmers in the Upper-West region of Ghana, this has not been the case. The highest output 
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rates have been experienced by those farmers who can afford to join either the Masara N’Arziki 
Farmers Association or Akate Farms, the two largest maize contract farming schemes in the 
region (Ragasa, Lambrecht, & Kufoalor, 2018). Therefore, poorer farmers who can only afford 
to join smaller schemes or can afford none at all, are at a disadvantage.  
Even those farmers who can afford to join the large schemes do not experience enough 
increased yields to compensate for the high costs of input packages. This became an especially 
prominent issue during the 2014-2015 growing season, after fertilizer subsidies had been 
eliminated, which, along with devaluation of the cedi, caused input package costs to rise 
(Ragasa, Lambrecht, & Kufoalor, 2018).  Maize prices also rose at this time, but not enough to 
combat the rate of input cost increases. This along with the extremely low prices paid to farmers 
by scheme managers for their crops (often below market value) resulted in 56 percent of farmers 
involved in a contract farming scheme experiencing net losses for the 2014-2015 season (Ragasa, 
Lambrecht, & Kufoalor, 2018). All of these factors have compounded to cause profits for 
farmers under a scheme to be lower than those of farmers not under a scheme (Ragasa, 
Lambrecht, & Kufoalor, 2018). Therefore, contract farming has been entirely unsuccessful in 
improving the economic circumstances of impoverished northern maize farmers. Overall, while 
SAP-driven policies have driven agricultural production throughout Ghana to rise, the growth 
hasn’t been rapid or stable, and it has failed to adequately address poverty among farmers. 
Oil: Economic Stimulus or Curse? 
 
 As the growth of agricultural exports has begun to slow, Ghana is relying more and more 
heavily on oil exports as a source of national revenue. When oil deposits large enough for 
commercial extraction were discovered in 2007, the expectation was that the resource would be 
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the solution to Ghana’s economic struggles (Fosu, 2017). However, the Ghanaian government’s 
management of oil revenue has not allowed for this expectation to come to fruition. Ghana 
remains vulnerable to falling victim to the “resource curse”, and oil revenue has not been 
distributed in a way that has allowed for the alleviation of poverty. 
 When a developing nation discovers abundant natural resources, one of the primary 
concerns is that it will experience the resource curse. This is the tendency for economic growth 
to be slower in nations with plentiful resources. Economists theorize that the presence of 
resources slows structural change in developing countries, consequently slowing economic 
development (Breisinger, Diao, & Wiebelt, 2014). The primary cause of this phenomenon is 
thought to be Dutch disease, or “deindustrialization caused by an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate” (Breisinger, Diao, & Wiebelt, 2014). More simply, when a developing country 
discovers abundant natural resources, it is thought to be vulnerable to adopting that resource as 
its primary source of income at the expense of other industries.  As the developing country 
becomes dependent on exports of the newly discovered resource, other industries, such as 
manufacturing, begin to suffer. This creates a long-term problem because revenue from the 
natural resource eventually declines with its reduced abundance, the real exchange rate returns to 
its original level, and the nation is left without other industries with which to compete on the 
international market (Breisinger, Diao, & Wiebelt, 2014). The term “Dutch Disease” comes from 
the decline in manufacturing that followed the discovery of natural gas in Slochteren, 
Netherlands (Breisinger, Diao, & Wiebelt, 2014). The effects of Dutch disease in Ghana could 
already be seen in 2013, when gold, cocoa, and oil made up 80 percent of the nation’s exports 
(Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). Additionally, by the end of Ghana’s period of oil extraction, 
it is anticipated that oil revenue will have averaged 30 percent of government revenue and 10 
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percent of GDP (Breisinger, Diao, & Wiebelt, 2014). Therefore, it is highly likely that, without 
proper management of oil revenue, Ghana’s economy will become exclusively dependent on oil, 
making Dutch Disease a reality for the nation. 
 Excessive dependence on oil revenue would be highly problematic for Ghana’s economy 
for two primary reasons. First, an economy built around the oil industry is not ideal for job 
creation. The extraction subsection of the oil industry, which has been the area experiencing 
growth in Ghana, has much lower employment expansion opportunities than agriculture and 
manufacturing, which have both seen declines since the discovery of the nation’s oil fields 
(Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016). Therefore, the overemphasis on oil as a potential driver of 
economic growth has resulted in reduced rates of job creation. Secondly, without careful 
management, the spending of oil revenue could result in a stunted process of industrialization in 
Ghana. Unchecked government spending of revenue disproportionately inflates prices in non-
tradable service industries, causing these sectors to grow while manufacturing lags behind 
(Breisinger, Diao, & Wiebelt, 2014). Therefore, the structure of the economy is altered and 
directed away from industrialization, which is generally viewed as an essential piece of 
development. Without carefully managing government expenditure of oil revenue, Ghana’s 
manufacturing industry could suffer greatly. 
 In order to prevent Dutch disease, Ghana must carefully manage government access to 
and use of oil revenue. This would be best accomplished by the creation of an oil fund into 
which a percentage of the revenue can be invested (Breisinger, Diao, & Wiebelt, 2014).  This 
would leave only what is not invested for the government to spend, thereby mitigating Dutch 
disease. However, this strategy is only effective until the government begins withdrawing from 
the oil fund (Breisinger, Diao, & Wiebelt, 2014). Therefore, the best Ghana can achieve is 
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modest mitigation of the effects of Dutch disease on the structure of its economy. In order to do 
so, Ghana has enacted a series of legislation meant to regulate the management of oil revenue. Of 
this legislation, the most prominent have been the Petroleum Commission Act and the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act of 2011 (Fosu, 2017). The former established the Petroleum 
Commission, which was tasked with overseeing both the actual utilization of oil revenue and the 
creation of additional legislation on the issue. The latter established guidelines for the handling 
of oil revenue, including the precise percentages of income that would be allocated for specific 
spending areas. Notably, this act also included the stipulation that income from royalties, 
interest, and corporate income tax related to the oil industry be placed in the Petroleum Holding 
Fund (Fosu, 2017). Legislation such as this has been found to have been generally successful so 
far at maintaining transparency surrounding oil spending (Fosu, 2017). However, the quality of 
Ghana’s institutions has seen a noticeable decline since the introduction of oil revenue (Fosu, 
2017). This indicates that the very institutional bodies put in place to manage the oil industry are 
being eroded by its existence. If this trend continues, Ghana’s relatively successful mitigation of 
Dutch disease may be short-lived. 
 The final major concern regarding Ghana’s discovery of oil deposits is whether the 
resource will allow for the alleviation of poverty. Another component of the resource curse is the 
potential for poor management and governance to lead to instability and conflict. This can occur 
when resource-driven economic growth is not distributed evenly, leading to increased wealth 
inequality (Mahama & Gakpe, 2015). Because of Ghana’s already widening wealth gap, the 
potential for oil revenue to either mitigate or worsen the problem is highly significant. 
Unfortunately, a number of characteristics of the Ghanaian government’s handling of oil 
regulation and revenue management have prevented the narrowing of the nation’s wealth gap. 
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First, Ghana adopted a liberalized and deregulated approach towards creating legislation around 
oil. This allowed foreign investors virtual free rein when extracting and exporting Ghanaian oil 
through minimal government claims to profits (Mahama & Gakpe, 2015). Therefore, the scope 
of Ghana’s ability to alleviate poverty using oil revenue was limited from the start due to policies 
meant to make Ghanaian oil attractive to foreign investors by maximizing their profits. Second, 
there has been little transparency on the amount of oil revenue that has been invested in the 
industries, such as agriculture and manufacturing, that are the primary employers of the poor 
population (Mahama & Gakpe, 2015). Because both industries have seen decline since the 
discovery of oil in Ghana (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2016), it is clear that what investment 
there has been in these sectors has not been effective. Therefore, oil revenue is either not being 
directed towards or ineffective at alleviating the nation’s wealth gap by raising the wages of the 
poor. Finally, the discovery of oil for many Ghanaians was accompanied by the expectation that 
the government would use the revenue to provide services at lower cost and reduce tariffs in 
order to improve living standards (Mahama & Gakpe, 2015). However, these changes have not 
occurred. Fuel, electricity, education, heath, and water costs have all continued rising for years 
after oil extraction began (Mahama & Gakpe, 2015). Therefore, the Ghanaian government has 
not prioritized alleviation of living expenses for investment of oil revenue, which would have 
greatly benefited the nation’s poor. Government allocation of oil revenue has not been targeted 
to mitigate poverty, and the overall boost to the national economy has not trickled down to 
improve the economic circumstances of the poor. Therefore, the discovery of oil in Ghana has 
served only the exacerbate the nation’s widening wealth gap. 
Sociocultural Impacts of Structural Adjustment 
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Changing Healthcare Policies 
 
One area of Ghanaian social governance that has seen deviation from SAP-sponsored 
policies is the health sector. In 1985, two years after the adoption of structural adjustment, the 
national governing party at the time, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), passed 
the Hospital Fee Regulation Act (Kusi-Ampofo, Church, Conteh, & Heinmiller, 2015). This 
created a cash-and-carry system of healthcare, eliminating government subsidizing of healthcare 
costs. Where the government had provided free and universal healthcare for over a decade 
following Ghana’s independence, patients were now required to pay user fees in their entirety 
(Kusi-Ampofo, Church, Conteh, & Heinmiller, 2015). The removal of government healthcare 
subsidies as a deflationary measure is a key component of the SAP model’s approach to 
establishing a free, privatized market (Oppong, 2001). However, this approach to healthcare 
creates a multitude of problems surrounding the quality and accessibility of medical care, which 
are only compounded by SAP’s exacerbation of wealth and social inequality. 
 The purpose of introducing user fees into the healthcare system was to allow for a higher 
quality of care. However, as the IMF and its structural adjustment policies began requiring 
cutbacks in government spending on social services, significant numbers of medical personnel 
were either laid off or received pay cuts (Oppong, 2001). This massively reduced quality of care, 
as there were fewer health workers employed in Ghana, and those that were left were working 
with reduced government funding to pay for supplies and facilities. Additionally, instead of user 
fees funneling more money into the system, Ghanaians who cannot afford them simply delayed 
medical care or went without it altogether (Oppong, 2001). Therefore, those patients not 
receiving lower quality care were affected by the cash-and-carry system because of lack of 
access to any level of care. Aside from being detrimental to the health of the individual 
 35 
Ghanaians going without healthcare, this inability to access care also posed a threat to the 
nation’s ability to combat health crises. Fewer people seeking care results in underreporting of 
diseases and other conditions. Therefore, the government is left without the necessary 
information to properly prepare for and address outbreaks or epidemics (Oppong, 2001). For 
example, SAP-driven cuts to healthcare spending left Ghana vulnerable to increases in 
occurrences of STDs and HIV because of lack of funding for screenings and treatments, as well 
as leaving fewer Ghanaians with access to information on how to prevent their spread (Oppong, 
2001). This vulnerability to the spread of STDs and HIV can be extrapolated out to any number 
of communicable diseases. The cash-and-carry system of healthcare, therefore, left Ghana 
underprepared for potential health crises and left its citizens susceptible to the risks of untreated 
health conditions. 
 While the consequences of failing to identify an impending health crisis would constitute 
a national issue, many of the negative effects of the fee-based healthcare system did not affect 
Ghanaians equally. The nation’s rural poor were disproportionately affected, both directly and 
indirectly. The most obvious impact upon the poor was their lower likelihood of being able to 
afford the fees required to receive medical care. However, this reduced access to medical care 
becomes of even greater concern when one examines SAP’s indirect effects on Ghanaians’ 
health. SAP-mandated currency devaluation caused the cost of food in Ghana to rise, leaving 
much of the nation’s poor population without the means to adequately feed themselves and their 
families. This caused many to become malnourished, which increases one’s likelihood of 
contracting diseases when exposed to them (Oppong, 2001). Another considerable challenge of 
the fee-based healthcare system that disproportionately affected the nation’s poor was rising 
costs of medical supplies and drugs. Devaluation of the cedi as part of structural adjustment 
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caused these prices to rise because the majority of medical products had to be imported into the 
country. This problem was only compounded when the Ghanaian government began diverting 
funds away from importing drugs and vaccines in order to focus on debt repayment (Oppong, 
2001). In the cash-and-carry system, where patients were expected to pay for pharmaceuticals, 
diagnostic tests, and medical supplies out of pocket, these rising prices made medical care 
increasingly unobtainable, especially for the nation’s poor. 
 While wealth inequality played a key role in the distribution of the consequences of 
Ghana’s fee-based healthcare system, there were also significant regional differences in both 
access to and quality of care. When cash-and-carry was first implemented, rural areas, which 
tend to be Ghana’s poorer regions, experienced much more dramatic declines in the rates of 
medical facility visits than those in urban areas (Oppong, 2001). This indicates that the rural poor 
were more likely than their wealthier urban counterparts to be unable to afford the fees 
associated with medical care and therefore less likely to seek medical attention when needed. 
Those living in rural areas also became more likely to lose their access to medical care because 
rural hospitals and clinics were much more likely to have their government funding cut due to 
lacking the political support that urban facilities enjoyed (Oppong, 2001). Not only did, rural 
Ghanaians face both financial and location-based obstacles to receiving medical attention, the 
care that they did receive tended to be of lower quality. This was due to cuts to transportation 
and fuel budgets, as prescribed by the SAP model. Without the availability of affordable 
transportation, it became difficult for highly trained medical professionals based in Ghana’s 
cities to travel to rural areas in order to provide care. Therefore, rural Ghanaians had access to 
only lesser-trained medical professionals (Oppong, 2001). The direct impacts of Ghana’s cash-
and-carry healthcare system, compounded with the indirect consequences of SAP-driven 
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budgetary cuts and price increases in other areas of the economy, had disproportionately high 
effects on the nation’s rural poor populations. Therefore, not only did the fee-based system 
decrease access to quality care overall, it also reinforced existing inequalities. 
 All the difficulties of access associated with the cash-and-carry system made healthcare a 
contentious issue in Ghana’s political atmosphere. Healthcare was such a primary concern that 
the New Patriotic Party (NPP) won the 2000 election with a campaign that focused heavily on 
promises of healthcare reform (Kusi-Ampofo, Church, Conteh, & Heinmiller, 2015). However, 
the NPP’s plan was not without opposition. Many thought that, because cash-and-carry was the 
result of IMF and World Bank influence in the country, it would be impossible to replace the 
existing system. They therefore viewed the NPP’s promises to do so as empty bids for votes. 
Aside from lack of confidence in the possibility for reform, there was fierce disagreement on 
how to fund the new healthcare program (Gómez & Prah Ruger, 2015). Despite such opposition, 
in August of 2003 the NPP passed the National Health Insurance Act, which created the National 
Health Insurance Scheme, or the NHIS (Williams et al., 2017). 
 Numerous domestic and international factors converged to allow the NPP to pass 
sweeping healthcare reform. The circumstance that directly allowed for the reform to be passed 
into law was the power dynamic within Ghana’s national government at the time. The NPP had 
both the presidency and the legislative majority (Gómez & Prah Ruger, 2015) and was able to 
influence the media so that the dominant narrative disparaged anyone strongly opposing the 
creation of the NHIS (Kusi-Ampofo, Church, Conteh, & Heinmiller, 2015). The indirect factors 
that allowed the NHIS to pass had to do with a growing and widespread understanding that cash-
and-carry was not working, and change was becoming a necessity. Overall, the Ghanaian public 
had come to understand that cash-and-carry had resulted in poor quality care. Additionally, 
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traditional sociocultural values called for community-based emergency funds, which fit well with 
the NHIS model (Kusi-Ampofo, Church, Conteh, & Heinmiller, 2015). Internationally, 
development donors such as USAID and UNICEF had begun to recognize the huge problems 
associated with cash-and-carry, and even the IMF and World Bank admitted that the only way to 
repair Ghana’s healthcare system would be with extensive reform (Kusi-Ampofo, Church, 
Conteh, & Heinmiller, 2015).  
 The NHIS was designed to solve the affordability and access problems of cash-and-carry. 
Funding for the program, via government financing and value added taxes, is meant to keep 
premiums affordable for users (Williams et al., 2017). Additionally, premiums are determined 
based upon the user’s income and consequent ability to pay (Jehu-Appiah et al., 2011). Those 
Ghanaians that are perceived to be unlikely to be able to afford even income-adjusted premiums, 
such as children, the core poor, pregnant women, and people over 70 years of age, are eligible 
for exemptions (Jehu-Appiah et al., 2011). These policy aspects are meant to ensure that even the 
poorest populations can afford quality healthcare, thus addressing the reinforcement of inequality 
that characterized the cash-and-carry system. While funding largely comes from the national 
government, the NHIS operates at the district level (Williams et al., 2017), making it more likely 
that facilities and resources can be proportionately distributed than under the cash-and-carry 
system. With both rural and urban districts being allocated funding from the national level, 
facilities ought to be more likely to be funded based upon local need without the obstacle of rural 
regions being preferred by national politics. Finally, the possible coverage of the NHIS is 
extensive. Enrollment in one’s local branch of the NHIS, or the District Mutual Health Insurance 
Schemes (DMHIS), is mandatory for Ghanaian citizens (Jehu-Appiah et al., 2011). Coverage 
includes “over 95% of disease conditions… inpatient, outpatient and emergency care, deliveries, 
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dental care, and essential drugs” (Williams et al., 2017). The NHIS, therefore, is constructed to 
cover as many Ghanaians, for as many medical needs, at as affordable rates as possible. 
 While the NHIS was created with solutions for cash-and-carry problems in mind, it still 
has significant flaws. Despite enrollment being mandatory, there has been a significant level of 
noncompliance (Jehu-Appiah et al., 2011). By 2013, only about 38 percent of the Ghanaian 
population was estimated to be enrolled in the NHIS (Williams et al., 2017). Those who chose 
not to enroll themselves or other members of their households in the NHIS were not random. 
There is evidence of substantial vertical and horizontal inequalities in enrollment. Vertical 
inequality is evident in the fact that all children in a given family are more likely to be enrolled 
when they come from wealthier households (Williams et al., 2017). However, the wealthiest 20 
percent of households are slightly less likely to enroll than those in the second wealthiest quintile 
because of their ability to pay for care out-of-pocket (Jehu-Appiah et al., 2011). These statistics 
indicate that the poorest Ghanaians continue to struggle to pay registration fees and premiums, 
despite efforts to offer exemptions to vulnerable groups. They also imply that NHIS care quality 
continues to be poor enough that those able to pay out-of-pocket for quality care chose to do so. 
Horizontal inequality is apparent in the evidence that suggests that large households from rural 
regions are unlikely to be able to enroll all of their children in the NHIS (Williams et al., 2017). 
Additionally, those families able to pay out-of-pocket for care are predominantly from urban 
areas (Jehu-Appiah et al., 2011). There is, therefore, considerable regional inequality remaining 
in Ghana, which significantly influences whether a family is able to afford enrollment fees and 
premiums or out-of-pocket healthcare.  
The rates of enrollment suggest that, despite efforts to improve quality of care and make 
the NHIS affordable for all Ghanaians, the exacerbation of wealth and regional inequalities 
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brought on by SAPs have left even those Ghanaians with premium exemptions unable to afford 
enrollment. Therefore, for the NHIS to fully realize its goals of providing affordable, universal 
healthcare, more work needs to be done to identify the actual ability of households to afford 
premiums and registration fees. Considering that the cost of registration and re-enrollment can 
deter even those with premium exemptions (Williams et al., 2017), exemptions for these fees 
should also be considered. While the NHIS is certainly not perfect, and is subject to reinforcing 
existing inequalities, it does so at significantly less extreme rates than the cash-and-carry 
healthcare system. Therefore, in the case of healthcare policy, movement away from SAP 
recommendations has helped Ghana to reduce inequalities of access and improve quality of care. 
Changing Education Policies 
 
In 1987, four years after Ghana first instituted structural adjustment, Ghana passed the 
Education Reform Program. This marked the transition of the nation’s educational system 
towards privatization (Kuyini, 2013). The percentage of Ghana’s GDP allocated to the education 
system declined significantly, following the structural adjustment principle of reducing public 
expenditure (Panford, 2001). With less public spending, the average quality of education 
dropped significantly across the country. Because of the difficult working conditions that 
accompanied lack of funding, Ghana’s most highly trained teachers, at all educational levels, 
began emigrating to other African nations and the West (Panford, 2001). Therefore, Ghana began 
to face a scarcity of adequately trained teachers. By 2008, there were 24,000 untrained teachers 
employed across Ghana (Kuyini, 2013). Even with the employment of untrained teachers, there 
are too few to devote adequate attention to each student. Consequently, urban classrooms began 
averaging 45-55 students each (Kuyini, 2013). Therefore, transitioning education towards 
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privatization resulted in Ghanaian students receiving significantly lower quality education 
overall. 
 Another consequence of the 1987 shift towards privatization was increased inequality of 
access to education. Although national enrollment numbers have increased at greater rates than 
population growth at all levels of education (Gyimah-Brempong, 2017), this improvement is not 
distributed evenly. Inequality in access to education has widened along both vertical and 
horizontal lines. Poor families first became affected by high costs of books and tuition. When 
user fees were introduced in 1999, it became even more unlikely that students from poor families 
would be able to advance to university-level education (Panford, 2001). Even when the Free 
Compulsory Universal Basic Education Policy was introduced in 1996, only primary education 
was covered (Kuyini, 2013). Therefore, poor students face significantly higher obstacles to 
remaining enrolled in school past primary education.  
There is also a significant level of regional inequality within Ghana’s education system. In 
2008, the Accra region had approximately 70 percent of its youth enrolled in schools, while the 
Upper East and Upper West regions had only 25.3 percent enrolled (McKay & Osei-Assibey, 
2017). This disparity illustrates the financial burden that minimized public subsidies for 
education places on the poor northern regions of Ghana. While cost of education is a significant 
barrier in these regions, it is only exacerbated by an extreme shortage of schools in the rural 
north (Kuyini, 2013). Therefore, those northern families with the ability to pay for education are 
often still denied access due to the physical lack of educational facilities. Additionally, gender 
disparities in educational opportunities are heightened in the north. Throughout Ghana, fewer 
girls than boys are enrolled in schools, and the gap widens with increased educational level 
(Gyimah-Brempong, 2017). In rural regions, the disparity is so strong that 41 percent of female 
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youth never attend school, compared to 21 percent of boys (Kuyini, 2013). This indicates that the 
financial strain associated with education in the north enhances cultural tendencies to value male 
education over that of females. 
Another significant change in Ghanaian educational policy occurred with the passage of the 
Education Reform of 2007. A key goal of this program is to tailor education to prepare the 
nation’s students to effectively compete on the global market (Kuyini, 2013). However, this 
intent has been criticized on the grounds that Ghana, as a developing economy, is not yet in the 
position to be capably competing with Western giants. Therefore, it seems unrealistic that 
individual students would be successful in the global labor market without a solid national base 
to back them (Kuyini, 2013). Additionally, the extreme focus on educating students with globally 
marketable skills has resulted in neglect of the fields that would be most beneficial to their local 
communities (Kuyini, 2013). For example, few Ghanaian universities encourage students to enter 
agro-based fields, which would allow them to progress the nation’s agriculture sector (Gyimah-
Brempong, 2017). In fact, the vast majority of Ghanaian graduates studied liberal arts and social 
sciences instead of hard sciences. This has resulted in a saturation of the market with graduates 
educated for social science-based fields, leaving many of them unemployed, and a continued 
need for the nation to import highly educated laborers (Gyimah-Brempong, 2017). Therefore, the 
goals of the 2007 reform have not aligned with the needs of the nation. Ghana has been 
prematurely pursuing SAP-driven goals to compete on the global market rather than investing in 





Sociocultural Components of Struggling Agricultural Industries 
 
 While Ghana’s participation in structural adjustment has had significant and complex 
effects on the economic health of the country’s agricultural industries, it has also had important 
implications for the sociocultural health of this sector. These implications can be clearly 
identified in the farmers who continue producing traditional crops despite their struggling 
markets and in the cultural histories that impact the success or failure of contract farming. With 
the introduction of SAPs in Ghana and their inability to develop export agriculture at the desired 
rates, many farmers, especially those producing cocoa, have begun to lose confidence in the 
long-term economic viability of their careers (Osei-Akom, 2001). However, this decline in 
confidence has not resulted in large numbers of cocoa farmers transitioning to the production of 
other crops. When cocoa prices fall, or fail to grow at anticipated rates, both farmers with long 
familial histories of growing cocoa and those who adopted the practice relatively recently tend to 
remain committed to their crops (Awanyo, 1998). Farmers’ reasons for remaining committed to 
an industry being neglected in favor of oil extraction are sociocultural in nature. 
 The cocoa market, for the farmers producing the crops, represents a means to fulfill one’s 
cultural obligations to support one’s family and community. Farmers whose families have owned 
and worked the same pieces of land for generations are not willing to give up these traditions or 
their financial value. Cocoa farming is particularly important to them because, despite occasional 
price drops and slow growth, it is viewed by farmers as a stable source of income with which to 
feed one’s family. This is of great importance because these farmers’ communities measure 
individual success by the ability to fulfill one’s duty to family and the wider community 
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(Awanyo, 1998). Migrant farmers also highly value cocoa farming because it lends itself to 
fulfilling social responsibilities. Cocoa has a long production cycle, allowing migrant farmers to 
rely on wage laborers for much of the process. They are therefore able to provide for their 
families without fully relocating to the regions of the country with the climatic conditions to 
support cocoa growth (Awanyo, 1998). Additionally, this long-term production process inherent 
in cocoa farming allows migrant farmers to continue working their land year-round. This is 
essential for them to retain their land rights, as many of their agreements allow usage rights to 
pass back to the local landowner if the plot remains unworked for too long (Awanyo, 1998). 
Therefore, transitioning to the production of a different crop, while potentially more profitable, 
could result in a migrant farmer losing the rights to his land. 
 Farmers also continue to produce cocoa through the industry’s economic hardships 
because of their belief in its long-term value. When farmers see cocoa prices drop, many of those 
who choose not to transition their land to the production of a different crop do so because they 
believe that the prices will rise again in the future. Additionally, many farmers have seen the 
emphasis placed on cocoa’s export potential by SAPs and anticipate its future value to rise ahead 
of any other options (Awanyo, 1998). Therefore, these farmers continue to produce cocoa 
because of their past experience with price fluctuation and understanding of their government’s 
priorities. Aside from the value of cocoa itself, many farmers remain loyal to the crop because of 
the perceived value of their farmland. Migrant farmers wishing to retain their land and pass it on 
as inheritance because it allows them to dispute attempts to repossess the plot. This is both 
because the long-term production process prevents lapses in land usage, and because cocoa 
allows for the expansion of farms across the full parcel of land. Locals who own this land find it 
much more difficult to revoke someone’s right to farm a piece of land that is fully in use, so 
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migrant farmers choose cocoa to protect their tenure for future generations (Awanyo, 1998). 
Therefore, the perceived value of cocoa and land tenure are often more important to farmers than 
fluctuation in short-term profits. 
 Another way in which Ghana’s experience of structural adjustment within the agricultural 
industry is affected by sociocultural trends is in the success or failure of contract farming. 
Scheme managers often express concern that contract farming cannot successfully accomplish 
the goals of SAPs if farmers do not adhere to their contracts (Ragasa, Lambrecht, & Kufoalor, 
2018). They worry about farmers using inputs such as fertilizers on non-contract farming plots, 
selling inputs to other farmers (Ragasa, Lambrecht, & Kufoalor, 2018), and selling outputs to 
buyers other than the scheme (Wuepper & Sauer, 2016). While many in-scheme farmers 
experience a reduction in profits (Ragasa, Lambrecht, & Kufoalor, 2018), the reasoning behind 
violating contracts is often not financial because they have the option not to participate in 
contract farming the following season. Instead, most farmers who violate their contracts do so for 
sociocultural reasons. 
 Failures in contract farming caused by farmers violating their contracts are primarily due 
to inadequate self-efficacy and social capital. Many poor farmers have low self-efficacy, or 
belief that they are capable of participating successfully in contract farming (Wuepper & Sauer, 
2016). This creates a poverty trap because the farmers with low self-efficacy are less likely to 
invest in the success of their farms through building relationships with the contract farming 
scheme. This leads to lower profits than they would have experienced had they not violated the 
contract, consequently reinforcing the idea that they are incapable of achieving success 
(Wuepper & Sauer, 2016). In many cases, low self-efficacy on the matter of contract farming is 
the result of cultural histories. Regions of Ghana that experienced failed cocoa cooperatives 
 46 
during the colonial period, which operated similarly to modern contract farming schemes, 
generally have lower self-efficacy among farmers. This is the case no matter what crop the 
farmer is engaged in producing (Wuepper & Sauer, 2016). Therefore, the cultural memory of 
systems similar to contract farming failing their communities causes farmers to expect the same 
failure. This expectation of failure then influences farmers’ likelihood to commit to their 
contracts and creates a self-fulfilling prophesy. 
 Contract farming is also less likely to be successful for those farmers who lack social 
capital, or the social organization, networks, and norms that enable coordination among farmers 
within a community. Social capital provides farmers with access to valuable information on how 
to succeed in contract farming and enables them to trust schemes and scheme managers because 
of the security that accompanies having a network to rely on (Wuepper & Sauer, 2016). Farmers 
with little or no access to social capital are therefore at a significant disadvantage when engaging 
in contract farming. The presence of social capital is also influenced by communities’ historical 
experiences. When Ghana was under British colonial rule, Christian missionary schools were 
established in villages across the country. These schools eroded the social relationships in the 
communities in which they were built by creating a divide between those who adopted 
Christianity and those who chose not to convert (Wuepper & Sauer, 2016). Therefore, the 
presence of these schools had a negative effect on the surrounding communities’ social capital. 
The impacts of the missionary schools are still felt today, with the communities in which they 
were present continuing to experience lower levels of social capital than their counterparts 
(Wuepper & Sauer, 2016). The cultural histories of Ghanaian communities have influenced the 
present-day success rates of contract farming by impacting whether farmers have adequate levels 
of self-efficacy and social capital. 
 47 
Sociocultural Impacts of Labor Migration 
 
The majority of youth preparing to migrate cite family sponsorship of their departures as 
a primary component in their decision to seek employment elsewhere (Dako-Gyeke, 2015). 
Therefore, the decision to leave Ghana is not solely based upon an individual need to pursue 
economic prosperity, but frequently includes sociocultural pressures based upon the role that the 
migrant is expected to perform within the family unit. Their families hope that the migrants will 
be able to pursue either further education without the burden of Ghana’s educational fees or to 
seek employment highly-skilled fields, in which Ghana has low demand for labor (Dako-Gyeke, 
2015). Leaving Ghana is almost never an exclusively personal decision for labor migrants, but 
rather a social one made based upon cultural expectations to provide for one’s family. 
Involuntary return migration has as many, if not more sociocultural components 
associated with it as does the initial decision to migrate. Aside from simply failing to earn 
enough before involuntary return to Ghana, many migrants are motivated to embark upon a 
second migration project because of the sociocultural conditions that they face upon returning to 
their communities. The gendered and cultural expectations that lead an individual to feel 
pressured to be the one to migrate and provide for their families only serve to aggravate the 
frustration associated with a failed migration project. Many of the Ghanaians who leave to seek 
economic or educational opportunities are males whose migration has been sponsored by their 
families or other members of their close-knit communities (Dako-Gyeke, 2015). When they 
return to Ghana empty handed, having lost their savings to the collapsed Syrian banks or 
deportation, these men are often forced to move in with their families (Kleist, 2017b). Because 
they have been brought up in a culture that correlates masculinity and family honor with being 
able to provide economically, becoming dependent on one’s relatives is often emotionally and 
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existentially traumatic. Furthermore, the response from the communities is usually far from 
supportive. The cultural significance placed upon providing for one’s family means that men 
who return home empty handed are often shamed by both family and the wider community 
(Kleist, 2017a). However much social ostracization and limited emotional support these 
returnees face, they are never fully abandoned. Family members of men who have experienced 
failed migration projects support them financially because of the expectation of reciprocity that 
exists in Ghanaian culture and the desire to prevent desperate actions, such as theft, which would 
bring shame to the whole family (Kleist, 2017a). Despite being able to depend upon family for 
financial needs, those who return from failed migration projects, especially women, are subjected 
to social ridicule from community members outside of their families (Kleist, 2017b). 
Consequently, enduring the social ostracization upon returning to Ghana empty-handed can be 
just as difficult as the sequence of events that led to involuntary return. 
 Due to the social stigma associated with failed migration projects, compounded upon the 
continued economic instability that accompanies involuntary return migration, failed migration 
projects are extremely hard on both the migrants and those close to them. This combination of 
circumstances makes it extremely common for Ghanaians to engage in a pattern of cyclical 
migration. Even before departing, most potential migrants plan to move on to other foreign 
countries if they are unable to secure work in their initial destination (Dako-Gyeke, 2015). Those 
who are forced to return to Ghana often leave again, either to try their luck in a third nation or to 
risk returning areas of Libya from which they had already been evacuated (Kleist, 2017b). The 
sociocultural consequences of returning home empty-handed after a failed migration project 
demonstrates that widening wealth inequality has more than just financial consequences for those 
in Ghana’s poorer class. The inability to earn a living adequate to support one’s self and one’s 
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family sparks the initial need to migrate, and the obstacles created by lack of financial assets 
during the migration process make it likely that these poor migrants will be forced to return 
home. Upon returning, they face sociocultural pressures to repeat the process, perpetuating the 
effects of class inequality even further. Therefore, within the issue of labor migration, the SAP-
prescribed policies which have contributed to Ghana’s widening wealth gap have detrimental 
sociocultural effects on the nation’s poor, in addition to the direct effect of economic strain faced 
by the lower class. 
 The social strain that returned migrants face is closely linked to their own and their 
families’ economic struggles. The debt and living expenses of returned migrants are shared by 
their families, especially for those who must move in with family members upon their return 
(Kleist, 2017b). These types of difficult economic conditions only add to the feelings of cultural 
inadequacy associated with being unable to support one’s self and reinforce the sorts of push 
factors that led the migrant to flee Ghana in the first place. Therefore, the economic strain of a 
failed migration project does not affect only the migrants themselves. The strain of return is 
nearly always shared by the families of the migrants. In addition to the shame associated with 
being an added burden upon the family that the returned migrant was meant to support, there is 
the expectation of reciprocity. Family members take in returned migrants experiencing hardship, 
partly because of familial duty and affection, but partly because they hope that the migrant will 
again find prosperity and be able to repay them (Kleist, 2017a). The dynamics at play in this 
cultural expectation of familial reciprocity exacerbate the returnee’s sense of shame at having 
experienced a failed migration project. They are therefore motivated to re-migrate in order to 
both fulfill their original promise to their family, and to repay those who took them in upon their 
return. In this way, economic strain upon the returned migrant and their family compounds the 
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social tension that arises from such circumstances and leaves the returnee feeling as though they 
have no choice but to engage in a pattern of cyclical migration. For these reasons, steps need to 
be taken to ensure that those migrants who do return to Ghana do not face the severe economic 
challenges and consequential social pressures to re-migrate that characterizes the current return-
migrant experience. If this is accomplished successfully, far fewer migrants will feel compelled 
to attempt additional migration projects. Lessening the widened inequality experienced in Ghana 
under SAPs would allow returned migrants to financially bounce back more quickly, lessen the 
sociocultural criticism associated with failed migration attempts, and therefore make returned 
more likely to remain in their home country. 
Structural Adjustment’s Political Implications 
 
SAPs and Ghana’s Transition to Democracy 
 
When Ghana’s dictatorial party, the PNDC, first implemented SAPs in 1983, it was far from 
a democratic process. At that time, there was significant public support behind the idea of an 
overhaul of the country’s economic structure (Graham, 1988). Ghana was facing an economic 
crisis, and the concept of foreign aid coupled with strategies to prevent the same circumstances 
in the future was welcomed. Therefore, when the PNDC announced its original Economic 
Recovery Program (ERP) in 1982, it received broad public approval (Graham, 1988). However, 
the version of the ERP that was implemented the following year was vastly different from the 
version that had been accepted by the Ghanaian people. Most significantly, the new plan 
lessened the government’s role in overseeing the economy rather than expanding regulation as 
previously promised (Graham, 1988). In essence, the neo-liberal approach to strengthening an 
economy by reducing government interference was not what the people of Ghana had expected. 
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Despite this fundamental deviation from what the public had anticipated and supported, the 
autocratic PNDC made it extremely difficult for any group to oppose the implementation of 
structural adjustment (Boafo-Arthur, 2001). Therefore, SAPs were opposed on the Ghanaian 
economy without the consent of the public. For this reason, many worried that the 1992 
overthrow of the PNDC and subsequent transition to democracy would lead to public backlash 
against SAPs and the discontinuation of the policies (Boafo-Arthur, 2001). However, the two-
party system that emerged allowed structural adjustment to endure despite continued concern 
over Ghana’s economic health. 
The structure of Ghana’s democracy following the 1992 revolution allowed SAPs to 
perpetuate for a number of reasons. First, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), which took 
office after the first election, managed to sway the public towards supporting structural 
adjustment. The NDC ran under the slogan “continuity”, and their election therefore represented 
the public’s desire to retain as much normalcy as possible during the transition to democracy 
(Boafo-Arthur, 2001). Therefore, the NDC managed to democratize the continuation of the very 
SAPs which had been autocratically imposed upon the country. Second, the NDC’s primary 
opposition, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), does not oppose the neo-liberal philosophy behind 
structural adjustment. Instead, they have historically blamed the NDC’s SAP implementation 
strategy for Ghana’s economic struggles (Boafo-Arthur, 2001). With both of Ghana’s major 
political parties behind SAPs, the struggle between the two is not over whether structural 
adjustment ought to continue, but over which party is best equipped to carry them out fairly and 
without corruption. 
Ghana’s two-party democracy, which universally supported the continuation of structural 
adjustment through the country’s political transition, can be attributed to the disproportionate 
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influence of outside donors over the political climate. While the NPP has taken issue with the 
NDC’s implementation of SAPs, they have not fully opposed the philosophy behind them. This 
is because foreign donors, on whom Ghana relies heavily, support political changes that do not 
interrupt the continuation of structural adjustment. This was clearly evident when Ghana 
received an enormous influx of development funding in 1992 following the democratic election 
of the pro-SAP NDC (Boafo-Arthur, 2001). With the foreign donor community clearly favoring 
political leadership that supports structural adjustment, the NPP is unwilling to fully oppose the 
continuation of SAPs so as to not offend these donors. In conjunction with this heavy influence 
from foreign donors is the near complete lack of influence from certain domestic groups. Rural 
farmers and the urban poor have historically been underrepresented in Ghanaian politics and 
have failed to adequately organize to oppose this marginalization (Boafo-Arthur, 2001). Because 
these two groups have been hit hardest by the failures of SAPs, their political will could have 
been a strong voice against continuing structural adjustment after Ghana’s transition to 
democracy. However, because they failed to organize in order to express their discontent, the 
opinions of foreign donors continued to dominate the influence on Ghana’s leading parties’ 
views of SAPs. 
Today, Ghana’s political system continues to democratize, as evidenced by the 2016 national 
elections. When Nana Akufo-Addo of the NPP won the presidency from the NDC’s John 
Mahama, it was the first peaceful transition of power between parties without the incumbent 
having reached the end of the two-term limit (Cheeseman, Lynch, & Willis, 2017). The 2016 
election campaign also represented a dramatic transition since the 1992 election. When Ghana 
was first beginning its evolution into a democracy, the opposition party had to campaign in secret 
so as to avoid retaliation. In 2016, however, the NPP was able to openly campaign against the 
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NDC (Cheeseman, Lynch, & Willis, 2017). Additionally, Mahama’s peaceful admission of 
defeat has largely been attributed to his lack of fear of prosecution from the NPP after leaving 
office (Cheeseman, Lynch, & Willis, 2017). While these changes signify a promising increase in 
democratization, Ghana still faces some obstacles to fully completing this transition. For 
example, despite consistent improvements in electoral practices since 1992, opposition leaders 
still suggest that the electoral commission can’t be trusted to prevent election fraud (Cheeseman, 
Lynch, & Willis, 2017). The NPP both questioned the results of its 2012 loss and went into the 
2016 campaign doubting the electoral commission’s capabilities (Cheeseman, Lynch, & Willis, 
2017). Additionally, while Ghanaian voters are on the path towards basing their votes upon the 
issues alone, there is still a culture of clientelism present. Many people continue to expect to 
receive gifts or money from parties attempting to buy their votes, although fewer and fewer 
allow this to be the sole deciding factor on election day (Cheeseman, Lynch, & Willis, 2017). It 
is clear that, while there are still improvements to be made, Ghana is well on its way to a fully 
democratic election process. 
 The 2016 presidential election also indicated that Ghanaians remain overwhelmingly 
concerned with the health of their nation’s economy. The primary reasoning behind voters 
ousting the NDC was economic. This was clear in the protests against electrical blackouts in 
regions that primarily support the NDC, where many people threatened not to vote unless 
promises were made to invest more heavily in infrastructure (Cheeseman, Lynch, & Willis, 
2017). Paired with this type of demonstration of public concern over economic issues, party 
campaigns focused more on differences in economic policy promises and less on emphasizing 
ethnic divisions between the two than in the past (Cheeseman, Lynch, & Willis, 2017). For 
example, the NPP focused the majority of its campaign on promises to invest in development and 
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criticisms of the NDC’s mismanagement of the country’s economic structure (Cheeseman, 
Lynch, & Willis, 2017). The 2016 election, therefore, indicates that the Ghanaian public remains 
concerned about their economic circumstances and their elected officials’ ability to improve 
them. However, with both major political parties fundamentally supportive of neo-liberalism, it 
seems unlikely that Ghana’s political structure will allow for a major departure from policies 
based on this economic theory, regardless of the continued concerns of the public. 
Political Distribution of Development Funding 
 
 Ghana’s political structure and practices contribute to the perpetuation of regional 
marginalization in a number of ways. Various political factors result in unequal distribution of 
development funding from the foreign aid that is attracted by Ghana’s reputation of adhering to 
SAPs. Among these factors are the desire to influence election results, the political influence of 
elites from each region, and external pressure from foreign donors. Throughout Ghana’s history 
as a democracy, its two major parties have used their influence over the distribution of foreign 
aid in the form of development projects in order to maintain power. This is most effective when 
the ruling party uses its majority to secure votes for reelection. The NDC has a long history, all 
the way back to Ghana’s democratization in 1992, of timing the implementation of infrastructure 
projects right before elections in order to gain public favor (Briggs, 2012). However, the regions 
to which developments funds are distributed has been just as important as the timing. The NDC 
and the NPP target regions without overwhelming support for either party for development 
projects in attempts to earn their votes. Therefore, the Ashanti and Volta regions, which 
consistently support the NPP and the NDC respectively, are sometimes overlooked for dispersal 
of foreign aid because their voting patterns are thought to be unchangeable. Instead, the 
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incumbent party focuses funding on uncommitted regions that tend to lean towards that party 
(Briggs, 2012).  
The practice of diverting development projects to certain regions in order to earn votes can 
be clearly seen in the NDC’s handling of the National Electrification Project (NEP) just before 
the 2000 national elections. In Ghana’s Upper East and Upper West regions, where rural areas 
had no access to electrical grids prior to the NEP, the only constituencies to receive benefits from 
the project had voted for the NDC by at least 48.8 percent in the previous election (Briggs, 
2012). All of these constituencies had equal need for access to power, but only those likely to 
vote for the incumbent NDC party received it. It is therefore clear that distribution of the benefits 
of the NEP was based on voting patterns, not need. Additionally, this practice was effective. In 
the 2000 election, the NDC lost votes in all regions of Ghana, but it lost five percent fewer votes 
in regions that had received benefits from the NEP than in those that had not (Briggs, 2012). This 
indication of the NDC successfully diverting development funds for votes makes it logical that 
Ghana’s political parties would continue similar practices in future years. Predictably, after the 
NPP won the majority during the 2000 election and throughout the subsequent decade, funding 
from Ghana’s participation in the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) program was 
disproportionately allocated to regions that had voted for the NPP (Abdulai & Hulme, 2015). 
Therefore, both major Ghanaian political parties have histories of influencing the distribution of 
development funding for the purpose of securing reelection. 
Another contributor to the amount of foreign aid received by a particular region is the 
amount of influence that the elite from that region hold in national politics. The historically poor 
Upper East and Upper West regions of Ghana have had their marginalization intensified by lack 
of access to development funding (Abdulai, 2016). This disproportionate exclusion from 
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development projects can be attributed to the underrepresentation of the Upper regions at the 
national level of Ghanaian politics (Abdulai, 2016). The Upper regions have been especially 
underrepresented during NPP administrations, when the only ministers from these regions 
appointed at the national level have been placed in relatively insignificant, non-Cabinet positions 
(Abdulai & Hulme, 2015). Without high-ranking members of the national administration 
championing them, the two Upper regions have continued to be marginalized through exclusion 
from development projects. 
The marginalization of the Upper regions under NPP administrations has been furthered by 
Ghana’s procedures for determining which regions receive foreign aid. The country’s 1992 
Constitution allows members of parliament to appoint most Cabinet members. MPs under an 
NPP majority government are unlikely to appoint Cabinet members from the Upper regions, 
which generally lean toward the NDC during election (Abdulai & Hulme, 2015). This lack of 
representation in the Cabinet is especially significant in conjunction with how the distribution of 
development funding is planned. For example, the dispersal of HIPC funding was left to the 
discretion of the Cabinet, meaning the Upper regions had no voice in the initial planning process, 
which resulted in them receiving far less aid than would have been proportionate for their rates 
of poverty (Abdulai & Hulme, 2015). Another instance of the Upper regions’ voices being 
insignificant in the planning process for distributing development funding was in the case of the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). In response to appeals from political elite within the 
Afram Plains2 in central Ghana, the region was included as a beneficiary of the MCA (Abdulai, 
2016). These requests were successful because supporting the cocoa production in this region 
was consistent with the NPP’s desired outcomes for the MCA. Therefore, when the Upper East 
                                               
2 See Appendix B 
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and Upper West, with no cocoa industry to attract the attention of the NPP, objected to their 
exclusion from the planned implementation of the MCA, their appeals were ignored by the 
national government (Abdulai, 2016). Without influence within the national political process, 
Ghana’s two Upper regions are excluded from the process of implementing development 
projects. They therefore receive disproportionately little access to foreign aid, which perpetuates 
the extreme poverty and marginalization of Ghana’s far north. 
The final political factor that contributes to regional marginalization in Ghana is the interests 
of foreign donors. The conditions under which foreign aid is provided are often detrimental to 
the prospects of Ghana’s poorest regions, and they leave room for manipulation by the national 
government in order to receive more funding. One of the reasons that Ghana’s Upper regions 
received no benefits from the MCA was the conditionality behind it. In order to receive funding 
from the MCA, Ghana had to submit a proposal that demonstrated how it planned to reduce 
poverty with visible results within 5 years of implementation (Abdulai, 2016). The Ghanaian 
government determined that the industry which was most likely to improve within this narrow 
timeframe was horticulture exports. Because horticulture is primarily concentrated in Ghana’s 
southern regions, the Upper regions were not consulted in the planning phase, despite the project 
being intended to address poverty (Abdulai, 2016). Therefore, the donor’s desire to achieve 
quickly visible results prevented the MCA from being implemented in Ghana’s poorest regions. 
Conditionality of foreign donation is also an issue in Ghana because it leaves room for the 
conditions to be exploited to extract more funding, without actually benefitting Ghana’s extreme 
poor. The first iteration of Ghana’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), the Ghana 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), stated that 48 percent of the plan’s funding would go to the 
extremely poor northern regions. This was promised because HIPC funding was dependent on 
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the receiving country’s commitment to alleviating extreme poverty (Abdulai & Hulme, 2015). 
However, the actual distribution of funding did not at all match the stated plan. Instead of 
diverting large amounts of funding to the regions with the highest rates of poverty, distribution 
was based entirely on population density. Therefore, the urban south received much more 
funding per capita than the rural north (Abdulai & Hulme, 2015). The planned distribution of 
foreign aid had been designed to satisfy donors, but the actual process failed to focus it benefits 
on the poorest regions. Additionally, the portion of funding distributed to the Health and 
Education Ministries was strategically used to satisfy the conditions of the PRSP program. This 
was done so that Ghana could continue to receive funding in the future (Abdulai & Hulme, 
2015). In the case of HIPC funding, the Ghanaian government was able to manipulate the 
process and claim adherence to the conditions without actually following through on attempts to 
alleviate extreme poverty. 
 The distribution of the development funding that Ghana receives as a model for SAP 
implementation has been politically manipulated so that the funding cannot effectively aid the 
nation’s poorest regions. The NDC and NPP use dispersal of aid to reward voters and gain 
additional support, to maintain existing power structures within the national government, and to 
appease foreign donors. All of these factors have perpetuated the marginalization of Ghana’s 
poor, especially those living in the Upper East and Upper West regions. 
Oil: Democratizing or Corrupting? 
 
 In the heavily oil-based economy that SAPs have helped create for Ghana, it is widely 
contested whether the resource will prove to be a positive or negative influence on the 
development of the country’s democracy. Some scholars suggest that oil has been integrated into 
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Ghana’s democratic structure and serves only to enhance it, while others warn that the massive 
influx of capital associated with resource discovery can only lead to corruption. While Ghana’s 
democracy remains intact, the pressures of oil are constantly putting strain on its integrity. The 
nation’s democratic institutions are continually having to correct for corruption within the ruling 
party at the time. 
 The primary argument behind the democratizing capability of oil is that the discovery of 
resources reinforces existing trends within the country into which they are introduced. This 
theory argues that Ghana was on the track of a multiparty democracy when the Jubilee oil field 
was discovered in 2007, causing laws and institutions around the management of oil and its 
revenues to be developed within a democratic framework (Odijie, 2017). When operating within 
this framework, the existence of oil can theoretically only strengthen Ghana’s democracy. This 
idea is furthered by the international consensus that Ghana has managed to build some of 
Africa’s strongest democratic institutions (Graham, Ackah, & Gyampo, 2016) under which to 
manage oil exports and their revenues. Therefore, Ghana should be well equipped to employ its 
oil abundance to further the development of its democracy. 
 Evidence for the presence of democracy in the management of oil center around the 
possibility for the ruling party’s handling of oil policies and revenue to be critiqued. Ghana’s two 
main political parties, the NPP and the NDC have openly criticized one another’s standpoints on 
oil for years, both while in and out of office. For example, both parties claim credit for the 
policies that allowed the oil discovery to occur (Graham, Ackah, & Gyampo, 2016). The NPP 
and the NDC both want the public to attribute the possibility of oil revenue to their policy 
decisions. Additionally, the proper use for oil revenue was heavily debated in the 2008, 2012, 
and 2016 elections, with the NPP wanting to institute social policies such as free education and 
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healthcare and the NDC promising to invest in infrastructure (Graham, Ackah, & Gyampo, 
2016). This level of debate between the two parties is thought to be both a sign of existing 
democracy and a deterrent against possible future corruption. Neither party fears retaliation when 
the other is in office, and the ruling party of the time is forced to rein in any potential corruption 
due to the knowledge that every decision will be heavily scrutinized once the administration 
changes hands again (Odijie, 2017). In addition to the opposition party being free to criticize the 
ruling party, non-governmental actors have the ability to appraise the government’s handling of 
oil. Civil society groups such as the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) 
emerged following the 2007 oil discovery to monitor whether the government properly follows 
laws on the use of oil revenue (Odijie, 2017). Additionally, the media has been known for 
publicly condemning any sign of corruption in the branches of government associated with oil 
management (Odijie, 2017). Because groups like the PIAC and the Ghanaian media are able to 
publicly criticize the government, Ghana is thought to be handling oil management in a 
democratic manner. 
 While there is ample evidence that Ghana has been able to integrate the oil industry into 
its existing democracy, there are also indications that the presence of oil revenue has led to some 
corruption. This aligns with some resource curse scholars’ belief that natural resources can 
inhibit democratic growth, in addition to stunting economic growth (Odijie, 2017). The evidence 
behind this theory is focused around the actions of both the NPP and the NDC while in power in 
regard to the handling of oil revenue. When the Jubilee field was discovered in 2007, the NPP 
had control over the national government. Therefore, the NPP had primary control over the 
creation and enforcement of policies about oil extraction, export, and use of revenue, and the 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) was altered to attract investment from foreign 
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corporations (Odijie, 2017). This resulted in a tendency for foreign investors not to be held to 
Ghanaian law, a practice which the NDC had to overturn after taking office in 2008 (Odijie, 
2017). The NPP’s commitment to attracting foreign investment had reached the extent of 
allowing national law to be violated and was not corrected until the change of administration. 
However, the NPP is not alone in corrupt handling of oil. The NDC remained in power until the 
2016 election, and the NPP was heavily critical of its management of the oil sector throughout 
this time period (Graham, Ackah, & Gyampo, 2016). Despite this substantial amount of 
criticism, many of the NDC’s questionable policies around oil revenue were not changed until 
immense external pressure forced the party’s hand. 
 Under the NDC, Ghana operated oil extraction based on the Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Bill, which allowed companies to become licensed and receive contracts based on 
negotiation with the government instead of through a process of competitive bidding (Odijie, 
2017). Therefore, these opportunities were not open to any interested party and the process of 
providing them was not transparent, which could result in the government receiving 
disadvantageous contracts and favoring certain investors. This law was not overturned until the 
Civil Society Platform for Oil and Gas joined the NPP opposition in pressuring the NDC (Odijie, 
2017). Without influence from outside the government, this corrupt bill would have remained in 
place, meaning Ghana’s democratic structures alone were unable to check the NDC. Two other 
instances in which external influence was needed to check the NDC were when members of 
parliament attempted to eliminate the PIAC. The first instance was soon after the establishment 
of the PIAC’s authority to oversee government management of oil revenue, which was seen by 
the majority party as a threat to Parliament’s power. The Civil Society Platform for Oil and Gas 
had to use heavy media pressure to prevent MPs from taking this corrupt step (Odijie, 2017). In 
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the second instance, the PIAC publicly criticized the government for failing to allocate oil 
revenue according to law, and the NDC-controlled Ministry of Finance attempted to eliminate 
the PIAC by terminating its funding. Media pressure was required to force the NDC to provide 
the funding (Odijie, 2017). In both of these cases, the NDC administration attempted to eliminate 
the primary institution between it and complete control over allocation of oil revenue. In each 
case, the NDC would have succeeded without media outcry.  
The actions of both the NPP and the NDC while in office indicate that both parties are 
susceptible to corruption in the management of oil. Ghana’s democratic checks and balances 
prevented the continuation of corruption in each of the discussed instances, but their emergence 
highlights the potential for resource discovery to test Ghanaian democracy. With SAP guidance 
leading Ghana’s economy to rely more and more heavily on oil exports, this corruption potential 
can only grow. Therefore, diversifying the economy to alleviate the political significance of oil 
revenue would also alleviate the pressure on Ghana’s democratic institutions. 
Conclusion 
 
 While the IMF has been touting the success of Ghana’s SAP program to Western nations 
for decades, these claims have been based solely on national economic trends. Many of Ghana’s 
indicators of overall economic growth, such as GDP and national poverty rate, present the image 
of consistent development, especially when compared to other Sub-Saharan African nations. 
However, this progress has not been without its complications. Decisions such as currency 
devaluation and shrinkage of the public sector have been controversial at best due to evidence 
that they may have caused more harm than good. Additionally, more micro-level economic 
indicators reveal a pattern of highly uneven economic growth. Since the inception of Ghana’s 
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SAP program, wealth inequality has risen steadily leading to mass labor migration, traditional 
industries such as agriculture have deteriorated, and the national economy had become highly 
dependent on oil exports. The economic impacts of structural adjustment in Ghana, while 
appearing on the surface to have been beneficial, have merely aided the already wealthy 
populations and flourishing industries, while contributing to the marginalization of the already 
disenfranchised. 
 Alongside the complicated nature of structural adjustment’s effects on Ghana’s economic 
development, the IMF and its proponents have largely failed to account for SAP’s relationship 
with Ghana’s sociocultural and political circumstances. Privatization has caused deterioration of 
the nation’s social programs, as evidenced by education and healthcare policies. Furthermore, 
these same social services have become broadly inaccessible to Ghana’s lower classes. The 
struggles of poverty have had significant sociocultural implications, as experienced by those 
choosing to become labor migrants and those making difficult decisions about the viability of 
their farms. Ghana’s decision to restructure its economy following the guidelines of SAPs has 
had powerful, often negative, impacts on the sociocultural experiences of its poorer citizens and 
communities. In the political sphere, structural adjustment’s impacts have been mixed. For the 
most part, SAPs and Ghanaian democracy have managed to coexist, despite the program’s 
originally authoritarian implementation. However, the distribution of development funding that 
Ghana receives in exchange for loyal adherence to structural adjustment has been plagued by 
power imbalances and foreign influences. Ghana’s practices of allocating funding are far from 
fair, rarely based on actual need, and often not executed in accordance with government pledges. 
Finally, the heavy emphasis that Ghana’s economy places on the oil sector in response to SAP 
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prioritization of exports has introduced countless opportunities for corruption to take hold and 
placed strain on the nation’s democratic institutions tasked with correcting such corruption.  
 Ghana’s experience with privatized healthcare and the subsequent introduction of the 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) provides an interesting example of policy evolution 
away from the recommendations of structural adjustment. While far from perfect, the NHIS has 
allowed for more equal access to healthcare, especially among the poorest Ghanaians. Because 
the NHIS was a response to the recognition of a severe flaw in the cash-and-carry system 
established under structural adjustment, it indicates that similar improvements could be achieved 
in other sectors with transition away from SAPs. Structural adjustment is based upon neoliberal 
economic theory, not the realities at play in the nations in which they are implemented. 
Therefore, Ghana’s logical next step would be to adjust its economic system to address the 
weaknesses of SAPs and the problems that have emerged since their implementation. It is this 
paper’s recommendation that the Ghanaian government take its recent exit from structural 
adjustment as an opportunity to reevaluate the health of its economy, at both the macro and 
micro-levels, and the effects of structural adjustment on sociocultural and political conditions. 
This evaluation should consist of multidisciplinary analysis, with the opinions of the IMF, the 
World Bank, and Western investors taken with caution and a level of skepticism. Finally, the 
conclusions of this reevaluation should be used as the basis upon which future economic and 
economically-informed social policy are built. The limitations and negative impacts of structural 
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